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Co-

Auto Co. v. Winters et al.'

After being decided in 1915 in the Kansas City Court of Appeals' this
case has again appeared in the reports. The majority opinion was at
that time dissented from by Judge Ellison, who caused the case to be
certified to the Supreme Court for final determination. The Supreme
Court has approved the decision' of the Kansas City Court of Appeals.
The facts were as follows: A and B, associates in business, contracted to
purchase an automobile, to be used in their business, from C, the agent
of the plaintiff company. In payment C took a note payable to himself,
signed by A as maker and indorsed on the back by B, prior to delivery.
The note read: "We promise to pay." Plaintiff charged B as co-maker
in his petition, but set out the note showing B's signature on the back.
Evidence was admitted without objection that the note was for the joint
1(1919)

210 S. W. 1.

ries Univ. Mo. Bulletin, p. 44, and was

2(1915)

180 S. W.

also commented

56.

RThe case was fully reviewed at the
time of the first decision in 12 Law Se-

(51)

Review, 549,
411.

on in 29 Harvard Law

and 25 Yale Law Journal
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benefit of A and B. B contended that under sections 10033 and 10034'
R. S. 1909 he could be charged only as an indorser and that since plaintiff
did not aver presentment and notice to charge him as an indorser he
was not liable. The Kansas City Court of Appeals took this view of the
case. Judge Ellison in the dissenting opinion thought that the words
"We promise to pay" created an ambiguity which might be explained by
extrinsic evidence.' The case seems to present three questions: first, can
parol evidence be introduced to charge an apparent indorser as a comaker? Second, do the words '"We promise to pay" create an ambiguity
which can be explained by extrinsic evidence? Third, admitting that the
party B cannot be shown by parol evidence to be a co-maker, was he
not an "accommodated party" within sections 10050,' 10059,' 10085,' R. S.
Mo. 1909 and thus not entitled to notice?
The first two questions have been fully considered in the articles
mentioned in note 3. It might be added that several courts have held
that only a prima facie liability as indorser is created by the fact of the
name appearing on the back of the note, and that, as between the parties at least, parol evidence may be introduced to show the real state of
affairs.' The use of the words "we promise to pay" has been held to raise
an ambiguity explainable by parol evidence in New York" and California. "Considering the purpose of the Negotiable Instruments Law the
'These sections correspond to sections
63, and 64, of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act adopted by Missouri in
1905.
5See article in 25 Yale Law Journal
411 referred in note 3, in which the reviewer agrees with the dissenting opinion of Judge Ellison and argues that the
use of the words "we promise" creates
an ambiguity, explainable by parol evidence. Section 10033 R. S. 1909 pro"A person placing
vides as follows:
his signature upon an instrument otherwise than as a maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed to be an indorser, unless
he clearly indicates by appropriate words
his intention to be bound in some other
Section 10034 R. S. 1909
capacity."
reads: "Where a person, not otherwise
a party to an instrument, placed thereon
his signature in blank before delivery,
he is liable as an indorser x x x."
"'Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an indorser
where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation and he has
no reason to expect that the instrument

will be paid if presented."
Section 80
N. I. L.
7"Except as hirein otherwise provided,
when a negotiable instrument has been
dishonored by x x x nonpayment, notice
of dishonor must be given to the drawer
and to such indorser, and any drawer or
indorser to whom such notice is not given is discharged." Section 89 N. I. L.
"'Notice of dishonor is not required
to be given to an indorser in either of
the following cases: (1) "x x x (2)
Where the indorser is the person to
whom the instrument is presented for
payment; (3) where the instrument was
made or accepted for his accommodation." Section 115 N. I. L.
'Kohn v. Consolidated etc. Co. (1900)
63 N. Y. Supp. 265; Mercantile Bank v.
Busby (1908) 120 Tenn. 652, 113 S. W. "
390 (between the parties); . Haddock,
Blauchard & Co. v. Haddock (1908) 192
N. Y. 499, 85 N. E. 682.
1"Dunbar Box & Lumber Co. v. Martin
(1907) 103 N. Y. Supp. 91.
"New England Electric Co. v. Shook
(1915) 145 Pac. (Calif.) 1002.
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contrary holding would seem more correct, however, and the weight of
authority is to that effect." On the third point the reasoning of the court
in the principal case is not so clear. Sec. 10050 R. S. 1909 says, "Presentment for payment is not required in order to charge an indorser where
the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation and he has
no reason to expect that the instrument will be paid if presented." Section 10085 reads: "Notice of dishonor is not required to be given to an
indorser x x x where the instrument was made or accepted for his accommodation." In the opinion in the principal case the court says: "The
majority opinion and the dissenting opinion in Kansas City Court of Appeals agree that one who signs as an indorser may not by parol evidence be shown to have signed in any other capacity, but under sections
10050 and 10085 parol evidence may be introduced to show in what character he indorses, whether he is an accommodation party or the party accommodated.""
The court then argues that an "accommodated party"
means one who gets the loan of credit without consideration."
As noticed in the previous review of the case there has been considerable controversy as to the proper interpretation of the term "accommodation party." It is defined by sec. 10000 R. S. 1909" and the cases
under note 14 as one who signs "without receiving consideration therefor." "Accommodated party" is not defined, but if the definition of "accommodation party" be correct, then "accommodated party" would obviously be one for whom an instrument is signed without consideration.
On the facts proven may it not !be fairly said that B was such an
accommodated party? The parties contracted for the article purchased
for their joint use. The seller was present and acquainted with the
agreement. Under the ruling of the court and the weight of authority
"Rockfield v. First Nat'l. Bank (1907)
77 Oh. St. 311, 83 N. E. 392, 14 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 842; Gibbs v. Guaraglia (1907)
75 N. J. Law 168; 67 At. 81; McDonald
v. Luckenbach (1909) 170 Fed. 434;
Mechanics, etc. Bank v. Ketterjohn
(1910) 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W. 1071.
See collection of cases in Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law, p. 77.
Is Page 3 in opinion in the principal
case.
"Black's Law Dict. defines "accommodation" as "an arrangement or engagement made as a favor to another, not
upon consideration received."
In the
opinion in the case of Rea v. McDonald,
68 Minn. 187, 1. c. 191, the court gives
this definition: "Accommodation paper
is defined as such as is made, accepted,
or indorsed by one party for the benefit

It
of another without consideration.
represents and is a loan of credit to the
party accommodated."
See also to the
same effect: Thorn v. Kibbee (1899) 62
N. J. Law, 753, 1. c. 754, 42 Atl. 729;
Dillingham v. Scott, 19 Hawaii, 421, 1.
c. 426; Mosser v. Criswell (1892) 150
Pa. 409, 24 Atl. 618; Morris County
Brick Co. v. Austin (1910) 79 N. J.
Law, 273, 75 At. 550.
"12 Law Series, University of Missouuri Bulletin, page 46.
1"An accommodation party is one who
has signed the instrument as a maker,
drawer, acceptor, or indorser, without receiving value therefor, and for the purpose of lending his name to some other
person x x x." This section corresponds to section 29 N. I. L.
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no parol evidence could be shown to the effect that B intended to sign
in any capacity other than as an endorser. A was the maker of the
note both for his own benefit and for the benefit of B. For this benefit flowing to B what consideration was there coming to A? It was
argued that B signed for his own benefit,' 7 which was doubtless true, but
it is difficult to see why he also was not "accommodated" by the maker of
the note, A.
Authorities on the point are meagre. But 6 well considered case in
Maryland,"' where the Negotiable Instrument Law is also in effect, would
seem to support this view. In that case the defendants signed as indorsers in order to secure a loan for the benefit of both the maker and
themselves. The evidence showed that the payee was present and knew
the agreement between the maker and indorsers and that he relied upon
both for the payment of his note. The court there held that altho the
loan for which the notes were given was not for the sole benefit of the
indorsers, they were still "accommodated indorsers," within the meaning
of Code Pub. Gen. Laws 1904 Act. 13, Section 99, 134, which corresponds to sections 10050 and 10085 R. S. Mo. 1909." In other words,
the indorser was an "accommodated indorser" even tho the maker was
also signing the note for his own benefit.
There is nothing violent in this construction and it would seem to
give effect to the intention of the parties without defeating in any sense
the intention of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. Under the
present ruling of the court B, who got valuable consideration from the
plaintiff company, escapes liability entirely because there was no allegation of presentment and notice. If he is the accommodated party on the
instrument, then, under sections 10050 and 10085 R. S. 1909, he is not entitled to notice. Should he be permitted to entirely escape merely because
the note was not given for his sole benefit?
JESSE E. MARSHALL.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-RIGHT OF ONE SPOUSE TO RECOVER FOR Loss oF
CONSORTIUM OF THE OTHER DUE TO THE NEGLIGENT ACTS or DEFENDANT.'

Bernhardt et al v. Perry.! The plaintiff's husband, a janitor in defendant's employ, was severely injured in the course of his duties as a result of the negligence of defendant in furnishing him dangerous appliances with which to work. The plaintiff brought this action for the loss
of the protection, support, and society of her husband resulting from
"See note in 12 Law Series, Univ. of
Mo. Bulletin, p. 46, and opinion in the
principal case.
"Bergen v. Trimble (1917) 101 Atl.
(Md.)
137.
5
9See notes 6 and 8 supra.

'For a discussion of this subject see 2
Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, p. 34; 24
H. L. R. 501; 26 H. L. R. 74; 10 Col.
L. R. 678; 14 Mich. L. R. 689; 20 Yale
L. J. 645; 77 Cent. L. J. 206.
2(1918) 208 S. W. 462 (Mo.).

NOTES ON

RECENT

MISSOURI

CASES

those injuries. The court held that the wife was not entitled to recover
on the ground that the physical injury being to the husband, he alone
could recover for all damages arising out of it, including damages for his
consequent inability to perform his duties to his wife.!
At common law an injury to the wife gave rise to two causes of action; one to the wife joined with her husband for the injury; the other
to the husband alone for the loss of the services, comfort and society or
consortium of his wife.' But the wife had no corresponding right of action for an injury to her husband, either because of her inferiority to
her husband, or because of her inability to sue in her own name.'
Under the Married Women's Acts the wife is given the right to sue
alone for violations of her personal rights.' She has been allowed to recover for the loss of her husband's consortium, when such loss was
caused by the alienation of the husband's affections' or the selling of morphine to the husband over the wife's protest
Recovery is allowed the
wife in such cases because the husband by his conduct is barred. It has
been said that the acts of defendant strike at the very foundation of the
marriage relation itself. It also has been said that recovery is allowed
because the torts of defendant are willful and intentional. Thus, a wife
in Clark v. Hill' was permitted to recover for loss of consortium against
a defendant who had driven her husband insane by threats of violence.
But it is not believed that such a classification of "intentional torts" is
sound. The wife's right of action for loss of consortium resulting from
the husband's physical inability should not be made to depend upon
whether the injury to the husband was caused by negligent or intentional
acts of the defendant.
When the loss of consortium and services results from the negligence of the defendant, the husband usually is given the same right of
8Woodson, J., 208 S. W. 462, 466:
"with those damages collected, he would
be just as able to perform all of his
marital duties and obligations to her as
if he had never been injured, and the
law presumes he would lischarge those
duties to the best of his ability, which
would fully compensate her for all damages she had received. But if he should
not do so, then she would have her legal
remedy against her husband, and not
against the person who injured him."
'Smith v. St. Joseph (1874) 55 Mo.
456, 17 Am. Rep. 660; Thompson v. Metropolitan St. R. Co. (1896) 135 Mo. 217,
36 S. W. 625; Schouler, Husband and
Wife, sections 140, 143.
6Schouler, Husband and Wife, section

143; 21 Cyc. 1530.
6 Sec. 8309, R. S. 1909. The statute
provides that a married woman shall
have as her separate property a right in
action for "any violation of her personal
rights"; and that she may institute in
her own name without joining her husband an action for the recovery of personal property including rights of action.
T
Clow v. Chapman (1894) 125 Mo.
101, 28 S. W. 328; Nichols v. Nichols
(1898) 147 Mo. 387, 48 S. W. 947;
Westlake v. Westlake (1878) 34 Oh. St.
621.
8Flandermeyer v. Cooper (1912)
85
Oh. St. 327.
'Clark v. Hill (1897) 69 Mo. App. 541.
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recovery since the Married Women's Acts as under the common law."
It has been contended that, since the statute removes the disabiliy of
married women to sue the wife should have an equal and corresponding right to sue for loss of consortium and support in case the husband
is injured by the defendant's negligence." But the courts have refused
to adopt this proposition, as is illustrated in the principal case.
A few courts, however, have concluded that since the wife may recover for her own injuries, and for all damage resulting therefrom, the
husband should rio longer have a right of action for the loss of his wife's
consortium. 2 The basis of these decisions is that the wife may recover
in full for the impairment of her ability to render services, and that she
should share these damages with her husband." These jurisdictions
recognize the right of one spouse to sue for the loss of support or services or consortium of the other only in those cases where the other spouse
is denied a righ t of action by reason of his conduct as in alienation of
affections or criminal conversation.
The law in Missouri has been formulated in accordance with the
weight of authority by a line of decisions culminating in the principal
case, Bernhardt et al v. Perry, decided by the Supreme Court en banc.
The husband may recover for loss of services and consortium of his wife
in cases where the loss is due to the defendant's negligence." The wife
was refused recovery where the loss was due to a physical injury to her
husband caused by the negligence of the defendant in Stout v. K. C.
Terminal R. R." and in Gambino v. Manufacturer's Coal and Coke Co."
The rule of these two decisions was recognized by the Supreme Court
in Bernhardt et al v. Perry. In the three cases the distinction was drawn
between negligent and intentional torts causing the loss of consortium.
If in these cases there is no sound distinction between negligent torts and
intentional torts then it follows that the decision in Clark v. Hill supra
is wrong.
It would seem that the Married Women's Acts place the wife upon
an equal footing with the husband; and if the husband has a right of action for loss of services and consortium of his wife, then the wife should
have a similar right of action. It is further submitted that if the reason"Smith v. St. Joseph (1874) 55 Mo.
456, 17 Am. Rep. 660; Contra: Feneff v.

Mass. 420, 91 N. E. 389; Blair v. Seitner
Dry Goods Co. (1915) 184 Mich. 304.

New York C. R. R. Co. (1909) 203 Mass.
278, 89 N. E. 436; 24 L.R.A. N.S. 1024;
Marri v. Stamford Street Ry. Co. (1911)
84 Conn. 9, 78 AtI. 582.
"See dissenting opinion of Bond C. J.
in Bernhardt v. Perry, supra.
"2Marri v. Stamford Street Ry. Co.
(1911) 84 Conn. 9, 78 At. 582; Bolger
V. Boston Elevated Ry. Co. (1910) 205

151 N. W. 724.
sMarri v. Stamford Street R. Co., inpra.
"Smith v. St. Joseph (1874) 55 Mo.
456.
"(1913) 172 Mo. App. 113, 157 S. W.
1019.
10(1913) 175 Mo. App. 653, 158 S. W.
77.
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ing of the court is sound that it would be giving double damages to allow
the wife to recover. for the loss of support and consortium of the husband where the loss is due to defendant's negligence, because he "is entitled to a recovery of damages resulting therefrom which in legal contemplation is supposed not only to make him whole, but enables him to
support his wife and children and to discharge all of his marital and parental duties due them in the same degree that the law imposed those duties upon him previous to the injury,""T that the same reasoning should
apply to deny the husband a recovery for loss of services and consortium
of the wife.
R. E. H.
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINl-DuTY To TRESPASSERs-Dalton v. M. K.
& T. Ry. Co.1 George Dalton, twelve years old, was injured by defendant's employees while they were engaged in backing a string of cars into
another string of cars on which he was playing. The accident occurred
in defendant's switch yards in Hannibal. Dalton was a trespasser on
the premises at the time of his injury. The evidence, however, showed
that defendant had actual knowledge that children had been accustomed
for several years to play in and around the cars in this switch yard. The
jury were instructed in substance, that the defendant was liable if it saw
or by the exercise of due care could have seen George Dalton in time to
have warned him or otherwise have averted the injury, and did not do
so. The jury were also instructed in effect that if usen of the premises
by children in their playing had been shown and that the defendant had
knowledge thereof then it was the duty of the defendant to give notice
before it began its switching operations. The Supreme Court held that
the case involved the humanitarian rule, but that the latter instruction
went beyond that rule, and imposed a duty on the defendant to warn the
trespasser on the premises whether or not the latter could have been
seen by the exercise of due care.
A survey of the cases reveals two possible situations where the
humanitarian doctrine may arise, viz: (a) where the plaintiff's peril is
discovered in time to avoid injury and (b) where it is not discovered!
Nearly all courts permit recovery where the defendant saw the peril
of the plaintiff in time to have avoided the injury by the exercise of
t

Woodson, J., in Bernhardt et aL v.
Perry, 208 S. W. 462. 465.
'(1919) 208 S. W. 828.
2Defendant saw plaintiff's peril-Cole
v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. (1906)

121 Mo. App. 605, 97 S. W. 555. Dutch.
er v. Railroad (1912) 241 Mo. 137, 145
S. W. 63. Plaintiff's peril could have

been discovered in time to have avoided.
Dale v. Hill-O'meara Construction Co.
(1904) 108 Mo. App. 88, 90 S. W. 1092.
Eppstein v. Pentwood (1906) 197 Mo.
.720,

94 S. W.

967.

Transit Co. (1905)
W. 865.

Rapp v. St. Louis

190 Mo. 155, 88 S.
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ordinary care, but there is conflict of authority where there is no actual
knowledge of plaintiff's peril and the courts of this jurisdiction seem to
be with the minority' in holding that the defendant is liable for failure
to discover the plaintiff's peril.
The principle case seems properly to come within the humanitarian
rule. The plaintiff was a trespasser and he was negligent in being on
top of a car in the defendant's switch yard where locomotives were being
used to switch cars about, and where it was probable that he might be
hurt.
The important question in the case is as to the extent of the duty
which defendant owed to the plaintiff. Under the universally accepted
rule the defendant is liable, if, after discovering the plaintiff's peril, he
negligently injures him. Furthermore, knowledge of the use of the
premises by trespassers is equivalent to actual knowledge of their presence on the premises; and under such circumstances there is an additional duty required of the defendant based upon the importance of human life to use due care to look out for trespassers so that their peril
may be discovered and injury averted.
The Supreme Court interpreted the second instruction as above stated, to mean that the defendant must warn at his peril whether or not the
plaintiff could have been seen by the exercise of due care. Does the instruction condemned extend the humanitarian doctrine? It seems quite
obvious that it does. The duty of the defendant in this case was" to use
due care to avoid injuring plaintiff after he was discovered or could have
been discovered by the exercise of due care.' There'was no duty to sound
a warning for persons who could not have been seen.
In Ayres v. Railroad' plaintiff in a drunken condition fell asleep on
defendant's right of way at a point which had been for years used by
pedestrian trespassers. Defendant had knowledge of the use. The evidence disclosed that altho the defendant's employes were looking ahead,
and exercising due care, still they were not able to see the plaintiff in
time to avoid running against him. The plaintiff contended that defendant was negligent in failing to ive a warning when it approached the
place where the presence of trespassers was to be expected, and where
the plaintiff actually lay, but the court held it was not negligence to fail
to sound the whistle or bell at such a place. The court held that the
$Otis, Humanitarian
Doctrine, . 46
Amer. L. R. 381. See note in 55 .. R.
A. N.S. 421. Betchenwald v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. (1906) 121 Mo. App.
545, 97 S. W. 557.
'Fearons v. Kansas City El. R. R. Co.
(1904) 180 Mo. 209, 79 S. W. 394;
Guenther v. St. Louis M. & S. Ry. Co.
(1891)
108 Mo. 18, 18 S. W. 846;

Chamberlain v. Railroad (1895) 133 Mo.
587, 33 S. W. 437; 34 S. W. 842.
'Warmington v. A. T. and S. F. Ry.
Co. (1891) 46 Mo. App. 159. Hila v.
Railroad (1890) 101 Mo. 36, 13 S. W.
946.
eAyres v. Railroad (1905) 190 Mo. 228,
88 S. W. 608.
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humanitarian rule did not apply. Apparently this case has not been overruled, and the fact that the injury in the Ayres case occurred on the
main track, and not in a switch yard should not make the rule different.
It is believed that this case also is an authority for the proposition that
there is no duty to warn a trespasser where he could not have been seen
by the exercise of due care. In Cleveland C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v.
Means, a somewhat different rule is announced.! There defendant was
engaged in switching cars on a side track. It had constructive knowledge
of the probable presence of children playing around these premises. The
court left it to the jury to say whether under the circumstances, a failure
to give a warning or signal before moving the cars was negligence which
was the proximate cause of the injury. According to the facts in this
case, it appears the defendant, had it been diligent, could have discovered
the danger to which the deceased was exposed in time to have avoided
injury, yet there is dicta in the case which would require the defendant
to warn by signal. Such an extension of the doctrine seems unjustly
to burden industry without promoting the security of human life. There
is no sound reason for extending a doctrine that finds so little support
in sound legal principles. It is submitted that both on reason and authority the court properly decided the case.
C. E. C.
State ex rel
PRACTICE-SUFFICIENCY OF MOTION FOR NEw TRIAL.
United Railways of St. Louis v. Reynolds.--The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that a motion for a new trial specifying that the "court erred
in refusing to give and read to the jury legal and proper instructions"
and "because the court erred in giving and reading to the jury erroneous,
illegal, and misleading instructions" was "too general and indefinite to
On certiorari, the Supreme Court
preserve for review such rulings."'
en banc held the motion was sufficient to present for review the instructions given and refused.
The question as to how definite specification of error in a motion for
a new trial must be to preserve for review the correctness of instructions complained of has been the subject of some conflict of opinion in
recent decisions. An analysis of the cases on this point discloses two
important questions for consideration, viz: (a) does section 1841, R. S.
1909' apply to motions for a new trial, and, if so, what degree of definite'(1914)
243.
1(1919)

104 N.

E.

213

W.

S.

785, 55 Ind. App.
782.

Faris, Wil-

liams, and Walker, JJ., dissenting.
2

Lampe v. United Railway Co. of St.
Louis (1918) 202 S. W. 438.
3This section is printed under Article

V of the Practice Code entitled "Pleadings" and reads, "All motions shall be
accompanied by a written specification of
the reasons upon which they are founded;

and no reason not so specified shall be
urged in support of the motion."
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ness is required; and, (b) if this statute does not apply what rule obtains?
(a) Section 1841 first came into our practice act in 1835' under Article VII entitled "New Trials," but the section also contained a provision as to the time of filing motions for new trials.' The section was
divided in R. S. 1845' and the provision as to the time of filing a motion
for a new trial was separated from that part which provided what the
motion should contain, each being placed in a distinct section. Both sections were printed under the article, "New Trials," and had reference
only to motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment. In R. S.
1855, the section which provided what a motion should contain (now
Section 1841) was changed to read "all motions," etc., and was printed
under the "Miscellaneous Provisions" of Article VI of the Practice Act
entitled "Pleadings."' As Faris, J., pointed out in State v. Rowe,' it
was "then for the first time made to apply to all formal motions of whatever kind made under the civil code." Did the shifting of this section
from the article, "New Trials," to another article of the Practice Code
called "Pleadings" and the changing of its phraseology to "all motions,"
prohibit its further application to motions for a new trial?
This question has been answered in the negative by a majority of
the cases.' The writer of the majority opinion in Wampler v. Atchison,
T. and S. Ry. Co." however took the view that this section did not apply
to motions for a new trial, because it was placed under the article
"Pleadings" and must be construed in the light of its surroundings and
refers to motions of all kinds which are in the nature of pleadings or
which attack pleadings. But the majority of the court did not place the
4Sec. 1, p. 469, R. S. 1835.

'This is now covered by Sec. 2025.
R. S. 1909.
'Art. VII, Sec. 1. "All motions for
new trials and in arrest of judgment
shall be made within four days after the
trial, if the term shall continue so long,
and if not, then before the end of the
term. Sec. 2. Every such motion shall
be accompanied by a written specification of the reasons upon which it is
founded."
'Sec. 27, p. 1235. Identical in form
with Sec. 1841, R. S. 1909. See note 3
supra. This section has retained its
present form and position in the statute
since 1855. Sec. 48, p. 662, G. S. 1865;
Sec. 3557, R. S. 1879; sec. 2085, R. S.
1889; Sec. 640, R. S. 1899; Sec. 1841,
R. S. 1909.
'(1917) 271 Mo. 88, 95; 196 S. W. 7.

'Carver v. Thornhill (1873)
53 Mo.
283; Sweet v. Maupin (1877) 65 Mo.
65; Fox v. Young (1884) 22 Mo. App.
386; Alexander v. The Grand Avenue
Ry. Co. (1893) 54 Mo. App. 66; Dale v.
Parker (1910)
143 Mo. App. 492; 128
S. W.
510; Bouillon v. Laclede
Gas
Light Co. (1912) 165 Mo. App. 320, 147
S. W. 1107; State v. Gifford (1916) 186
'S. W. 1058; Johnson v. Waverly Brick
and Coal Co. (1918) 205 S. W. 615;
Wynne v. Waggoner Undertaking Co.
(1918) 204 S. W. 15; Bright v. Sommers (1919)
214 S. W. 425.
Contra:
Chapman v. Eneberg (1902) 95 Mo. App.
127, 68 S. W. 974; Hooper v. Standard
Life and Accident Insurance Co. (1912)
166 Mo. App. 209, 148 S. W. 116.
10(1916) 269 Mo. loc. cit. 473, 190 S.
W. 908.
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decision on this ground, and the view expressed is obiter.Y The majority
opinion in the principal case does not discuss section 1841 but merely cites
the Wampler case. It is, therefore, not authority for the proposition that
section 1841 does not govern motions for a new trial. It is submitted
that this section, in the light of its history and by the weight of authority,
is applicable to such motions."
A majority of the cases which apply section 1841 hold that a general
assignment of error in instructions is not sufficient in a motion for a new
3
trial." The Wampler case distinguishes a few cases on the ground that
they do not condemn a general assignment of error as to instructions, but
it is said by Graves, J., that they mere'y hold that there were no assignments of error in the motions in those cases covering the particular errors urged on appeal. But neither are these cases authority for the
proposition that a general assignment of error is good even if it were
broad enough to cover the error complained of.
(b) Even those cases which do not consider section 1841 applicable
incline towards the view that a motion for a new trial must be specific
15
The Wampler case is cited in the principal
in its assignment of error.
"In the principal case, 213 S. W. loc.
cit. 784, Walker, J., (dissenting) discussed the Wampler case and said, "This
for the reason that the motion in that
case was sufficiently specific to conform
to the requirements of section 1841 and
hence the general observations of the
learned writer of that opinion may not
unfairly be classed as obiter so far they
conclude that said section is not controlling."
2Bond, J., (concurring in result only)
said in the Wampler case, 269 Mo. loc.
cit. 486, "I do not think a statute so all
embracing in its language can' be logically limited only to certain motions filed
during the trial of a law suit which are
addressed to the "Pleadings."
"Thus the following assignments of
error have been held insufficient: that
"the court erred in giving improper instructions to the jury," Bright v. Sammons (1919) 214 S. W. 425; Wolf v.
Baun (1919) 211 S. W. 697; contra,
Hooper v. Standard Life and Accident
Ins. Co. (1912) 116 Mo. App. 209, 148
S. W. 116; that the court gave "illegal,
improper, and erroneous instructions
over defendants motion." State v. Rowe
(1917) 271 Mo. 88, 196 S. W. 7; State
v. Selleck (1917) 199 S. W. 129; that

"the court misdirected the jury as to
Wynne v. Wagthe law in the case."
goner Undertaking Co. (1918) 204 S. W.
15; Sweet v. Maupin (1877) 65 Mo. 65;
State ex rel v. Woods (1911) 234 Mo.
16; Maplegreen Co. v. Trust Co. (1911)
237 Mo. 350; Polski v. City of St. Louis
(1915) 264 Mo. 458.
"Graves, J., said, 269 Mo. 481, that
the cases did not hold that a general assignment of error in the motion was insufficient but only "that the motion
failed to contain any assignment of error
(either general or specific) which would
cover the assignment urged in the appellate courts."
"Matthews v. Central Coal & Coke Co.
(1915) 177 S. W. 650; Kansas City Disinfecting Co. v. Bates (1918) 273 Mo.
300, 201 S. W. 92; Seitz v. Pelligreen
Const. and Inv. Co. (1918) 203 S. W,
503; Nitchman v. United Ry. Co. of St.
Louis (1918) 203 S. W. 491; Probst v.
St. Louis Basket and Box Co. (1919)
207 S. W. 891; Kansas City Trunk Co.
v. Bush (1919) 208 S. W. 625; Grace et
al v. M. K. & T. Ry. Co. (1919) 212 S.
W. 41; Baker v. Bakewell (1919) 208
S. W. 844; Contra, Palmer v. Huckstead (1917) 197 Mo. App. 512, 196 S.
W. 1053.
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case as authority for the rule that a general allegation of error in a motion is good, yet the motion in the Wampler case stated that "each and
all of the instructions" were erroneous and the expressions of the court
5
on general assignments may be construed as dicta'
One of the functions of a motion for a new trial is to direct the
mnd of the trial court to the specific error committed on the trial." It
would seem that a motion to fulfill this office and to reduce the labor of
courts and afford trial courts a fair opportunity to correct error, should
at least point out what particular instruction or instructions are wrong."
Altho the decision of the principal case does not exclude the further application of section 1841 to motions for a new trial, it definitely establishes the rule of practice in Missouri that the correctness or incorrectness of instructions given or refused by a trial court in a civil case may
be preserved for review on appeal by a motion couched in the most general language.
J. C. B.
ACCIDNT INSURANCIE-"SUICIDE

STATUTE"-INSANITY-Scales

v.

Na-

tional Life & Accident Ins. Co. Section 6945 R. S. Mo. 1909, commonly
known as the "suicide statute," provides as follows: "In all suits on
policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing business in this state to a citizen of this state, it shall be no defense that the
insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the satisfaction of
the court or jury trying the cause, th-At the insured contemplated suicide
"6In Wynne v. Waggoner Undertaking
Co. (1918) 204 S. W. 15, Walker, J.,
discussed the Wampler case and said,
"This ease seems from its reasoning to
hold that a general statement in a motion for a new trial as to errors in instructions is sufficient, but it will be
found that the motion in that case while
general in its terms, so far as ignoring
the number of the instructions is concerned is specific in referring to each
and all of those to which objections are
interposed, and therefore it was not
general in the sense in which such
tions have been ruled insufficient in
er cases, which is not the fact in
instant case."
"Roher v. Brockhage (1884)
15
App. 16, 25; Bouillon v. Laclede

mooththe

Mo.
Gas
Light Co. (1912) 165 Mo. App. loc. cit.
324;
147 S. W. 1107; In Maplegreen
Co. v. Trust Co. (1911) 237 Mo. loc. cit.
363, 141 S. W. 621, 624, Lamm, C. J.,

speaking for the Supreme Court en banc
said . ................. the office of a
motion for a new trialis to gather together those rulings complained of as
erroneous and solemnly and formally
present them, one by one, in black and
white, to" the judge, in order that he
may have a last chance to correct his
own errors without the delay, expense
or other hardships of an appeal.
This,
on the theory that even a judge is entitled to a last chance-a locus poenitentiae."
"Walker, J., (dissenting) in the principal case, 213 S. W. 782, 783, said,
"The cardinal purpose of our code of
procedure is one of simplicity and directness..
.......
An observance of the requirements of this section
(1841) cannot but aid the trial court in
readily ascertaining and speedily determining the errors assigned, especially as
to instructions."
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at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in
the policy to the contrary shall be void."
The recent cases of Scales v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co.'
Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.,2 and Wacher v. National Life
& Accident Ins. Co.' presented* the question whether by virtue of the
above statute, the beneficiary under an accident policy would recover
where the insured had committed suicide while sane.
This question the Supreme Court answered in the negative. The
reasons were: To recover under an accident policy the insured must
have met death by means of an accident;' self-destruction while sane is
not an accident;' hence, while the statute prevents the defense of suicide
it will not be inflated to prevent a showing that the insured did not meet
an accidental death, and so create a cause of action where none exists.'
Authority on the precise point from other jurisdictions was lacking
because statutes of this nature are found in very few states. In Missouri the question had never been fully considered. The courts seem
tacitly to have regarded suicide while sane as an accident.
The Supreme Court in the Scales and Brunswick decisions goes at
some length into prior decisions in Missouri. A passing reference will
do here. Judge Faris at p. 48 of 213 S. W. in the Brunswick case says
of Logan v. Ins. Co.:' "Under these defenses and the above admission
it was competent for the court to find and conclude that the insured was
insane when he committed suicide." Such a conclusion disposes of that
decision as any authority for the instant question.
Fetter v*. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,' as stated by Judge Faris, is authority only for the proposition that when the plaintiff under an accident
policy has made out a prima facie case of accidental death the burden is
on the company to show that it resulted from natural causes.
Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co." was disposed of as being of only
persuasive force. James Whitfield was insured under an accident policy
for $5,000 in case of accidental death with the proviso that the insurer
should be liable for only one-tenth that amount in case of death due to
injuries intentionally inflicted, sane or insane. The case was tried upon
'(1919)
2(1919)

212 S. W. 8.
213 S. W. 45.

'(1919)

213 S. W. 869.
'Scales v. National Life & Accident
Ins. Co. (1919) 212 S. W. 1. c. 10;
Brunswick v. Standard Accident Ins. Co.
(1919) 213 S. W. I. c. 48.
'Brunswick v. Ins. Co. (1919) 213 S.
W. 1. c. 47; Scales v. Ins. Co. (1919)
212 S. W. 1. c. 8.

'Scales v. Ins. Co. (1919) 212 S. W.
1. c. 10; Brunswick v. Ins. Co. (1919).

213 S. W., 1. c. 48.
'
Scales v. Ins. Co. (1919)

212 S. W.

1. C. 10.
sLogan v. Casualty Co. (1898) 146 Mo.
114, 47 S. W. 948.
'Fetter v. Casualty Co. (1902)
174
Mo. 1. c. 269, 73 S. W. 592, 61 L. R. A.
459, 97 Am. St. Rep. 560.
"°Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
(1907) 205 U. S. 489, 27 Sup. Ct. 578,

51 L. Ed. 895.
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the agreed fact that the insured died "from bodily injuries caused by a
pistol shot intentionally fired by himself, for the purpose of thereby
taking his own life; that the cause of the death of said Whitfield was
suicide." The insurer was held liable for the full amount; the reduction
to one-tenth of the liability being a defense within the prohibitive terms
of the statute. The force of the decision as a precedent in our case depends on whether James Whitfield was sane at the time he took his life.
No decisive statement as to his sanity appears. Faris, J., was of the opinion that plaintiff's reply admifted his sanity and that the court fell into
error of considering suicide while sane an accident.
The question in Laessing v. Traveler's Protective Association of
America" and Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co." was whether death
was due to natural causes or accidental causes or to injuries self inflicted
while sane. The cases go extensively into the presumptions and burden
of proof under these circumstances, but furnish no criterion as to the
effect of the statute when a sane man has taken his life.
The decision in Knights Templars' and Masons' Life Indemnity Co.
v. Jarman" was upon the stipulated fact that the insured was insane
when he killed himself.
Roy, C., speaking of Applegate v. Travelers' Ins. Co.," in his opinion
in Scales v. Ins. Co.," says: "The plain truth is that courts and counsel
in all those cases proceeded on the theory that, under the Logan case,
suicide by a sane person was an accident covered by an accident policy."
But in the Applegate case Reynolds, J., made the statement: "This
however is not a case of accident but of design-a case of suicide by
poison." The decision was that by Section 6945 R. S. Mo. 1909 the
beneficiary under an accident policy could recover altho the insured had
taken his life while sane. This is not an accident. That case, therefore,
is squarely in conflict with the decisions under consideration.
If the legislative intent in the suicide statute is that suicide simply
because it is suicide may never become a defense-that is, if the emphasis is to be put on the exact words "suicide shall be no defense," a
narrow and technical argument may be advanced against the decisions.
In an action on, an accident policy the plaintiff must make out a
prima facie case of accident." In any case where from the facts death
may have been the result of either accident or of selfkilling while sane
a presumption arises against the latter." True under Laessing v. Ins.
"Laessing v. Ins. Co. (1902)
280, 69 S. W. 469.

169 Mo.

"Reynolds v. Casualty Co. (1918)

274

Mo. 83, 201 S. W. 1128.
KsKnights Templar v. Jarman (1902)
187 U. S. 197, 23 Sup. Ct. 108, 47 L.
Ed. 139.
"(1910) 153 Mo. App. 63, 132 S.W. 2.

15(1919) 212 S. W. 1. c. 10.
'Laessing v. Travelers Protective
Ass'n. (1902) 169 Mo. 272, 69 S. W.
469; Travelers Ins. Co. v. McConkey
(1902) 127 U. S.661; 32 L. Ed. 308.
"Reynolds v. Casualty Co. (1918) 274
Mo. 1.c. 96, 201 S. W. 1131, 14 R. C. L.
1236.
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Co., supra, the presumption that death was not by the hand of the insured
does not relieve the plaintiff from establishing that death was accidental.
Death might have been natural. But few cases where there is a real
question whether death was due to accident or suicide while sane will
present any difficulty to the plaintiff in establishing that death in any
event was not natural. Presumptions in law refer to the burden of
going forward with the evidence." The plaintiff now has a prima facie
case of accident and the burden would be upon the defendant to come
forward with evidence that death was due to suicide while sane. A defense is a general assertion that the plaintiff has no cause of action, a
denial of the truth and validity of the complaint." Thus, any proof of
suicide while sane would be a denial of the truth and validity of the complaint in which plaintiff alleges that death was due to accident and hence
a defense. But the exact words of the statute are suicide shall be "no
defense," and it would effectually bar any evidence to overcome the presumption against suicide and that presumption will be decisive of
the case until overcome by evidence which shall out weigh the presumption. ' The plaintiff would
recover on his prima facie case, the defendant
2
being unable to rebut it."
The purpose of the statute, as applied to accident insurance, was to
prevent insurance companies from excepting from liability a particular
accident, viz: accidental suicide. The purpose was not to prevent insurance companies, writing accident insurance, from stipulating that they
would not be liable for something not an accident. Intentional self destruction by a sane man is clearly not an accident. Self destruction
while insane is an accident.
The conclusion that the decisions under review are sound cannot be
escaped. Their effect is to add despite the statute an element to the
prima facie case the plaintiff must produce. Wherever the facts balance
between self killing while sane and accident the decisions do not disturb
the presumption which rises against the former.'
But where a plaintiff seeks to recover under an accident policy, the
insured having taken his own life, evidence must be produced of the
insanity of the deceased, at the time of his death, because in absence of
evidence the law presumes a man sane,' and the burden is with the plaintiff to overcome this presumption.'
184 Wigmore on Evid. 2490-2511; State
v. Hudspeth (1900) 159 Mo. 178; 60 S.
W. 136.

214 R. C. L. 1236; Reynolds v. Casualty Co., (1918) 274 Mo. 1. c. 96, 201
S. W. 1131.

"Bouvier's Law Dict., Rawle's 3rd ed.

"Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry (1872)

"0Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Thornton
(1900) 100 Fed. 582, 40 C. C. A. 564,
49 L. R. A. 116.
"Kelley v. Jackson (1832) 6 Pet. (U.

15 Wall. 580, 21 L. Ed. 236; Reynolds
v. Casualty Co., supra.
2'Blackstone v. Ins. Co. (1889) 74
Mich. 592, 42 N. W. 156, 3 L. R. A.

S.) 622, 632, 8 L. Ed. 523.
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The degree of insanity necessary to make self destruction accidental,' becomes of moment. In jurisdictions having no "suicide statute" a
provision avoiding liability "in case of suicide" is construed to allow recovery where deceased was insane.' These cases, construing such a provision and laying down a test as to when deceased was sane and when
insane at time of self-destruction would seem to furnish a guide.
Suicide raises no presumption of insanity nor is it prima facie evidence of insanity.' But the manner of the act and all its circumstances
may be considered in determining the question of insanity."
Mental
Not every degree of insanity would seem to be sufficient.'
disorder at least is necessary.' The courts of this country have followed,
in the main, either the English rule or the rule of the Federal Courts.
3
The English cases of Borradaile v. Hunter"
and of Dormay v. Borradaile' stated the rule to be that the deceased must be of so unsound
a mind as to be unaware that his act will lead to his self destruction. It
is not sufficient that he was incapable of recognizing its moral obliquity.
This rule seems to be followed in New York," Massachusetts,' Vermont,n'and Kentucky.' To the rule as laid down in New York and Vermont"7 the qualification is found that if deceased is compelled to take
his own life by an irresistible insane impulse his act is not intentional suicide.
The rule of the Federal Courts and of a majority of the states," tho
somewhat variant in terms, makes the test upon the ability of the in"Accident Ins. Co. v. Crandel (1886)
120 U. S., 1. c. 531; 7 Sup. Ct. 685, 30
L. Ed. 740.
"Bigelow v. Ins. Co. (1876) 93 U. S.
284, 23 L. Ed. 918; Knickerbocker Ins.
Co. v. Peters (1875) 42 Mo. 414.
,"Weed v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.
(1877) 70 N. Y. 561. But see Coffee v.
Home Ins. Co., 3 Jones & S. 314, saying
that it might go to remove the presumption of sanity. The question of insanity is one for the jury. (95 U. S. 223,
24 L. Ed. 433.) Insanity must exist at
the time of self destruction to excuse
suicide, and it is insufficient to show
that the insured was insane at other
times (55 Ga. 103).
The fact that a
juror considers suicide as conclusive
evidence of insanity is good cause for a
challenge (2 Dill 572, note).
"Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1895)
69 Fed. 505; Grand Lodge Order of
Mutual Aid v. Weitling (1897) 168 Il.
408, 68 Am. St. Rep. 123, 48 N. E. 59.
"IV Cooley's Briefs on the Law of

Insurance 3245.
"Moore v. Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
(1874) 3 Flipp. 36.
"1(1843) 5 Man. & G. 639, 44 E. C. L.
335.
32(1848) 5 C. B. 380, 11 Jur. 231.
"Van Zandt v. Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co. (1873) 55 N. Y. 169; 15 Am.
St. Rep. 215.
"4Cooper v. Ins. Co. (1869) 102 Mass.
227, 3 Am. Rep. 551.
mHathaway v. National Life Ins. Co.
(1875) 48 Vt. 335.
"Masonic Life Assoc. v. Pollard's
Guardian (1905) 89 S. W. 219, 28 Ky.
Law Rep. 335.
11(1875) 48 Vt. 336.
"184 Am. St. Rep. I. c. 547; Vance on
Insurance p. 521.
"9Conscience and will overpowered.
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Peters
(1875) 42 Md. 414. Act free from all
immorality and action entirely blame.
less. Life Assoc. of Am. v. Waller
(1886) 77 Ga. 533. Incapable of form-
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sured to realize the moral quality of his act." This rule has been followed in Illinois," Michigan," Indiana,"3 Texas," Ohio,' Washington,"
and Minnesota."
Jurisdictions following this rule have qualified it by
holding that where the deceased was driven by an irresistible insane impulse to take his life, it was not intentional suicide."
A third rule has been adopted in a few jurisdictions that in as much
as suicide is a criminal act, self destruction 'should occur while there is
mental capacity to form a criminal intent to relieve the insurer from liability.
This test would seem equivalent to the Federal rule. A man unconscious of the moral consequences and effect of his act cannot commit a
felony, tho he may take his life with the set purpose of doing so and
conscious of the physical consequences.
In criminal cases Missouri courts have adopted knowledge of right
and wrong as the test of.insanity which will form a defense, tho they
have specifically rejected the uncontrollable insane impulse."
Where an insurer has not contracted for liability in case of intentional injuries a construction which holds an injury intentional where
there was a knowledge that the act would produce the result may be
valid. But mental unsoundness rarely attains such degree that the sufferer does not know that fire will burn, knives cut, or water drown him. The
intent to live is not formed on the knowledge of these results alone. It
is as complex as life. The consequences of suicide to "himself, his character and his family"-the right and wrong of the act are far more important in forming the intent. Since an accidental act is spoken of as
ing a rational judgment
self destruction.
Hiatt
Ins. Co. (1873) 2 Dill.
40(1872) 15 Wall. 580,

with regard to
v. Mutual Life
572, note.
21 L. Ed. 236.

"New Home Life Assoc. v. Hagler
(1862) 29 Il. 437.
4
2Blackstone v. Standard Life Ins. Co.
(1889) 74 Mich. 592, 42 N. W. 156, 3
L. R. A. 486.
"3Michigan Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Naugh (1891) 130 Ind. 79, 27 N. E. 393.
44Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v.
Walden
(1894) (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S. W. 1012.
"Schults v. Ins. Co. (1883) 40 Oh. St.
217.
"Knapp v. Order of Pendo (1905) 36
Wash. 601, 79 Pac. 209.
4"Scheffer v. Ins. Co. (1879) 25 Minn.
534.
5
"I ns. Co. v. Terry (1872)
15 Wall.
580; Knapp v. Order of Pendo, 36
Wash. 601, 79 Pac. 209.
The leading
statement of the rule and one which is

often used verbatim as an instruction, is
found in Ins. Co. v. Terry. supra. In
Ritter v. Ins. Co. (1895)

28 U. S.

Ap.

612, 70 Fed. Rep. 954, an understanding of the moral consequences is said to
be such understanding as a sane man
would have of the effect of the act on
himself, his character, and his family, and
the wrongfulness of it. In Manhattan Life
Ins. Co. v. Broughton (1883) 3 Sup. Ct.
99, Judge Gray approves the Federal
rule, declaring it simpler in that it does
not involve the subtle and vexing question of how much the exercise of will
can be attributed to a man so unsound
mentally that he cannot distinguish right
from wrong.
"Phadenhauer v. Germania Life Ins.
Co., (1872) 7 Heisk. 567, 19 Am. Rep.
623; Bagley v. Alexander, East's Notes,
Case 79, Morley's India Dig. 352.
5
.State v. Pagels (1887) 92 Mo. 300;
State v. Riddle (1912) 245 Mo. 451.
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contrary to the intent it would seem that it should be contrary to those
elements which constitute intent and it is submitted that when insanity
has overthrown the knowledge of moral consequences and of right and
wrong, self destruction is not in any just sense an intentional act,--but
rather is contrary to intent and an accident.
J.A. W.
PROHIBITION-RIGHT

Ot STATE TO A CHANGE OF VENUE FROM JUDGE

OV PREJUDIcE. State ex rel Attorney General v. John G.
Slate.' This case seems to be the first instance in which it has been held
in Missouri that the state over the objection of the'defendant may take
a "change of venue" in a criminal case on the ground of prejudice of the
judge.
This was a proceeding in prohibition in which it was sought to have
a preliminary rule made permanent restraining the judge of the Circuit
Court of Cole County from exercising further jurisdiction in the case of
State v. Scott.! Scott was charged with embezzlement and grand larceny. The Attorney General at the direction of the Governor had assumed control of the prosecution. Before the jury was impaneled an Assistant Attorney General filed an affidavit alleging that the judge was
prejudiced against the prosecution and particularly against attorneys
conducting the case for the state. They then moved that a different
judge be called to preside at the hearing of the case in accordance with
section 5201 R. S. 1909.' The court overruled the motion. Whereupon,
application was made to the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition.
Respondent contended that irrespective of prejudice the state is not
entitled to a "change of venue" in a criminal case. In its decision the
Supreme Court held that the writ of prohibition should issue to prevent
a judge who was prejudiced against the prosecution from exercising jurisdiction.
The respondent relied on section 22, Art. 2 of the Constitution'
which guarantees to the accused "a speedy trial before an impartial jury
of the county," contending that this clause constituted a bar to the state

ON GROUND

1(1919) 214 S. W. 85.
'Circuit court of Cole county, Missouri.
Case No. 1879.
8 "If,
in any case, the judge shall be
incompetent to sit, for any of the causes mentioned in section 5198, and no
person to try the case will serve when

request another circuit or criminal judge
to try the case x x x."
'"Rights
of
Accused
in
Criminal
Prosecution-In
criminal
prosecutions
the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel; to demand the nature and cause of

elected as such special judge, the judge
of such court shall in either case set
the case down for trial on some day of
the term, or on some day as early as
practicable in vacation, and notify and

the accusation; to meet the witnesses
against him face to face; to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his behalf; and a speedy, public trial
by an impartial jury of the county."
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from a "change of venue" without the consent or against the objection of
the accused. The position of the relator was, that, without denying this
proposition on the question of a change of venue from the county, it did
not apply to a change from the judge.
The distinction would seem obvious and has been repeatedly drawn
in Missouri. Thus it is proper to refuse a "change of venue," when the
statute directs the calling in of another judge;' or to refuse a transfer
to another court in the same county whert a "change of venue" is directed.'
From the language of section 5198 R. S. 1909' it would seem rather
obvious that no distinction is intended to be made between the rights of
the state and of the accused when the ground of the application is that
the judge is "in anywise interested or prejudiced." By expressly mentioning the defendant in the fourth class of cases in which a judge is
deemed incompetent, the logical conclusion is that the legislature intended in the other classes to grant the right either to the state or to the defendant. This conclusion is well nigh irresistible, in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State ex relv. Wear." In
that case the court held that prohibition would issue to prevent Judge
Wear from exercising jurisdiction in a case in which his son was defendant.
The question which would seem still to remain open is: In what
manner shall the fact of prejudice and bias be determined. Is it sufficient that the prosecution shall make an affidavit alleging prejudice?
' "Venue, a neighborhood, place or
county in which an injury is declared
to have been done, or fact declared to
have happened. 3 BI. Com. 294. Venue also denotes the community in
which an action or prosecution is
brought to trial, and which is to furnish the panel of jurors. To 'change
venue' is to transfer the cause for trial
to another county, or district." Black's
Law Dictionary.
Moore v. Gardner
(1851) 5 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 243; Armrtrong v. Emmet (1897) 16 Tex. Civ. App.
242, 41 S. W. 87; Sullivan v. Hall
(1891) 86 Mich. 7, 48 N. W. 646, 13
L. R. A. 556; State v. McKinney (1869)
5 Nev. 194.
6State v. Parker (1888) 96 Mo. 382, 9

S. W. 728.
'State v. O'Bryan (1891) 102 Mo. 254,
14 S. W. 933.
'"When Judge deemed incompetent to
try case-when any indictment or crim-

inal prosecution shall be pending in any
circuit court or criminal court, the judge
of said court shall be deemed incompetent to hear and try said cause in either
of the following cases: First, when the
judge of the court in which said cause
is being tried is near of kin to the defendant by blood or marriage; or, second, when the offense charged is alleged to have been committed against the
person or property of such judge, or
some person near-of kin to him by blood
or marriage; or third, when the judge
is in anywise interested or prejudiced,
or shall have been counsel in the cause;
or, fourth, when the defendant shall
make and filean affidavit, supported by
the affidavit of at least two reputable
persons, not of kin to or counsel for the
defendant, that the judge of the court in
which said cause is pending will not afford him a fair trial."
'(1895) 129 Mo. 619, 31 S. W. 608.
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Doubtless in such circumstances a trial judge would ordinarily decline
further jurisdiction and would exercise his right to call in another judge
or call a special election under section 5201 R. S. 1909. But suppose the
judge denies the allegations of prejudice? Is it contemplated that he
shall hear evidence and determinine the fact of his own prejudice? It
would not seem to be in accord either with the dignity of a judge or
with fundamental notions of justice that a man should sit in judgment
on his own case.' In the fourth class of cases mentioned in section 5198
R. S. 1909 where the defendant alleges prejudice of the judge the legislature has determined the question by providing the exact procedure. The
filing of the affidavits in the form prescribed by the statute raises no issue
of fact and the court has no discretion.11 In the first three classes of
cases no procedure is prescribed. In the case under consideration the application for a writ of prohibition alleged that the circuit judge was
prejudiced, and not merely that the prosecuting officer had filed an affidavit alleging prejudice. On this allegation an issue of fact was formed
0
and tried by the Supreme Court exercising original jurisdiction."
The
court said:
"Some settled propositions as forewords are apposite. One of these
is an axiom of the common law wholly applicatory by the closest analogy,
which runs in substance that no man ought to sit in judgment on his own
case. The other is that, if the objection of prejudice against the state be
raised in a case, such objection must of necessity be raised by the sworn,
elected, prosecuting officer of the state; that is, either by the prosecuting
'See State v. Jim (1832) 3 Mo. 147;
State v. Gates (1855) 20 Mo. 401.
In
State v. Witherspoon (1910) 231 Mo. 1.
c. 716 the court said:
"The law does
not contemplate an issue of fact upon an
application for a change of venue on
account of the disqualification of the
judge, to be heard and determined by
the judge alleged to be disqualified and
therefore, the evidence offered in support of the application, together with the
agreed statement of facts, were not properly in the case and should not be considered.
When the application is properly made and supported by affidavit as
required by the statute the judge has no
discretion.
He cannot sit in judgment
upon
the
question
of
his
own
disqualification,
but
must
grant
the
change as applied for."
It is true that
in this case the application was made by
the defendant and was based on the

fourth class of cases in section 5198 R.
S. 1909 in which the legislature has prescribed the method of making the application, but the reasoning of the court
would seem to have equal application in
a case where prejudice and bias in the
trial judge were alleged by the state.
"State v. Witherspoon (1910)

231 Mo.

706, 133 S. W. 323; State v. Spivey
(1905) 191 Mo. 87, 90 S. W. 81; State
v. Thomas (1888) 32
Mo.
App. 159.
Contra: State v. Sayers (1875) 58 Mo.
585 under Act of 1873.
"Article
x,
Section 3 Constitution
gives to the Supreme Court power to
issue original writs.
Prohibition was
held to be an original remedial writ
within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Thomas v. Mead (1865) 36 Mo.
232.
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attorney of the county wherein the cause is pending, or by the Attorney
General of the State.""
But how "raised"? This case does not settle the point, :but, in the
light of the foregoing statement it would seem that the filing of an affidavit by the prosecuting officer alleging prejudice should leave the trial
judge no discretion except to determine the sufficiency of the affidavit
as to form. If this is not true it would follow that in such cases the
trial judge must try the issue of his own prejudice. If he finds that no
prejudice exists, then the state can apply for a writ of prohibition to the
Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court clearly has original jurisdiction in such cases, arising out of its inherent supervisory authority over
all the courts, yet is it contemplated that the question must always be settled by that body? And if so, should any distinction be made when the
allegation of prejudice is made on behalf of the defendant (under the
first three classes specified in Sec. 5198) or on behalf of the state?

JESSE E. MARSHALL,.
"State ex rel v. Slate (1919)
W. I. C. 89.

214 S.

